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Criminal justice

hild Privilege?
BY WENDY M. WATTS
e all would agree that
certain relationships are
- vital to society and that
these relationships canLinot exist without confidentiality. These relationships are protected by five
privileges. Firmly established in
American law, they are: the attorneyclient privilege, the physician-patient
privilege, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the priest-penitent privilege, and the husband-wife privilege.
The word privilege is derived from
the Latin phrase "privata lex." It is
defined as a particular and peculiar
benefit or advantage enjoyed by a
person, company, or class beyond
the common advantages of others.
Black's Law Dictionary 1077 rev. 5th
ed(1 979). In American law, there are
three categories into which rules of
privilege fall. Coburn, "Child-Parent
Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child," 74 Dick.
L. Rev. 599, 602-603 (1970). First,
there are privileges designed to protect the rights of the individual, such
as the exclusionary rule or the privilege against self-incrimination. Second, there are privileges designed
to maintain the "integrity of the system of government," such as the
privilege that accompanies government secrets. Fisher, "The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the
Law of Privileged Communications," 10 Wayne L. Rev. 609, 609610 (1964). Finally, there are privileges designed to protect individuals who are participants in certain
relationships which the state deems
(Continued on page 12)
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I BY DAVID A. SCHLUETER
rustrated with her parent's
illegal and undetected
L7
conduct, a teenager gathered the contraband in a
garbage bag and presented it at the police station. In the past year, public attention
has focused on similar incidents
where children have reported their
parents to the police. Is evidence
"gathered" in this way admissible?
Are incriminating statements by the
parents to the child admissible
against them? In most jurisdictions
the answer is "yes" on both counts.
The reactions to these "childsnitching" cases are mixed, and
often accompanied by calls for protection for any statements made or
actions observed within the parentchild relationship. Similar calls are
heard when the focus is on a parent
who possesses incriminating information about a child's criminal activity. See, e.g., Port v. Heard, 764
F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985). Although a
majority of courts considering the
issue have rejected a parent-child
privilege, there is a popular move to
urge codification of the privilege,
which would block testimony by
one against the other.
Balanced against the general principle that evidentiary privileges are
generally disfavored because they
potentially block otherwise relevant
evidence, Trammel v United States,
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980), is the argument that some relationships deserve assurance that shared
confidences will be protected. Intense debate almost always sur(Continued on page 13)
N
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(Continued from page 11)
rounds the question of whether we
should expect that a member of a
particular relationship will not be required to testify against another
member of that relationship. The intensity of the debate is evidenced
in part by the fact that in approving
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress could not agree on codification of privileges and left that issue
to the federal courts.
A parent-child privilege was not
recognized at common law and was
apparently not seriously considered
by the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The current momentum for recognition of such a privilege was apparently triggered when
a New York court concluded that a
parent-child privilege could be
based upon both the United States
and New York constitutions. People
v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979). Since
then, only a few states have codified a parent-child privilege: Idaho,
Minnesota, and Massachusetts. Of
those courts which have considered the availability of such a privilege, a great majority of them have
rejected it. And of those cases applying the privilege, most were tried
in New York state courts. Only a few
federal courts have recognized the
privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Agosto), 553 F. Supp.
1298 (D. Nev. 1983); In re GrandJury
Proceeding (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 579 (1982).
To overcome the reluctance to
adopt yet another privilege, proponents of the parent-child privilege
typically offer a number of justifications. The chief argument is one
grounded on the Constitution-the
right of privacy. Still another argument rests on the freedom of religion clause of the First Amendment.
The remainder take on the form of
social or policy arguments.
David A. Schlueter isAssociate Dean
and Professor of Law at St. Mary's
University, San Antonio, Texas.
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The constitutional right
of privacy
Proponents of the parent-child
privilege lean heavily upon decisions from the Supreme Court which
indicate that a right of privacy is implied in the Constitution. This right
has two aspects: the right to conduct one's affairs in private free from
government intrusions and the right
to personal autonomy. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is
an example of the former aspect.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
is an example of the latter. Proponents also point to those decisions
which spell out the importance of
"family" privacy and autonomy. For
example, the Court has indicated
that important personal decisions
affecting marriage, procreation,
schooling, and living arrangements
are important rights which may not
be lightly treated by the government. To date, however, no Supreme Court decision has indicated
that the right to privacy absolutely
requires any privilege in private
communications between family
members.
Proponents of the privilege are
therefore left with advancing the
following syllogism: (1) there is a
constitutional right to privacy; (2)the
Court has recognized the importance of the family and has declined
in some cases from interfering with
child-rearing; (3) the Court has recognized the desirability of shielding
certain confidential communications; (4) therefore, there is a constitutional basis for recognizing a
parent-child privilege which will
nurture and protect the family unit.
Few would quarrel with the first
three arguments. But the fourth
proposition does not necessarily

To Our Readers
Part 11of "Making Sense of the
Bail Reform Act" will appear
in the next issue. It will examine the impact of the Salerno decision.

follow from the first three. What
most proponents of the parent-child
privilege fail to recognize isthat any
constitutional right to privacy, like
so many other constitutional rights,
isnot absolute. Assuming that a particular interest is protected under
the broad and nebulous umbrella of
"privacy," the government is permitted to limit that interest if it can
demonstrate a compelling government interest and that its means of
limitation or intrusion are necessary
and closely tailored to meeting that
interest.
The Court has generally recognized that this close scrutiny is not
necessary unless the government
has placed some substantial or significant hurdle in the way of the individual's exercise of the right to
privacy. In the absence of a hurdle,
the government's actions are generally only subject to a "rational basis" review. That is, is there some
rational basis for the government's
limitation or action? A common example of this is the ability of states
to set procedures and standards for
obtaining a marriage license. The
right to marry is fundamental, but
absent substantial interference with
that right, no compelling government interest need be shown.
Thus, in a discussion of a parentchild privilege, the threshold issue
is whether compelled disclosure of
otherwise confidential statements
presents a substantial hurdle or barrier to the right of the parent and
child to communicate in the future.
Proponents argue that forcing achild
or parent to testify against the other
will almost always harm the relationship. But studies in this area are
apparently inconclusive, as one
proponent of a broad family privilege points out. "DevelopmentsPrivileged Communications," 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 1578-81 (1985).
And that argument could be made
in virtually any case where any family member or close friend is compelled to testify against another
member or friend. A difficult and
emotion-racked dilemma does not
necessarily a privilege or exclusionary rule make, especially when rev(Continued on page 35)
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han) 579,582-84 (D. Conn. 1982)
acknowledges a parent-child privilege based upon the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment.
Although a number of federal
courts have not recognized the parent-child privileges, none have entirely abandoned the concepts.
Some courts have given the green
light to the privileges if the appropriate fact situation arises. See
United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d.81 7
(4th Cir. 19820 and United States v.
Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985).
Many who argue against the adoption of a privilege state that the following cases are parent-child privilege cases that the courts have
rejected. When read closely one will
see this is not so. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings Matthews, 714 F.2d
223 (2d Cir. 1983) (court rejected a
broad in-law privilege not parentchild); United States v. Davies, 768
F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1985) (court rejected idea of parent-child privilege
within context of police investigation only); United States v. Penn, 647
F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (court rejected a very broad family, not parent-child, privilege).
Answering the critics
Some argue there isn't a need for
the parent-child privileges. One argument advanced for this proposition is that there aren't "enough"
cases. Isthis to suggest that the parent-child relationship will only rise

to the level of deserving protection
when such cases reach epidemic
proportions? Another criticism that
has been advanced is that these
privileges would be shields for intrafamily crime and/or physical, sexual
or mental abuse. This is not true. No
privilege exists in those and other
harmful situations. Critics also contend that the parent or child who is
the party to the proceeding may always block the introduction of testimony by the parent or child witness. This is not the case. The
adverse-testimonial privilege, which
applies in criminal cases only, is a
witness-held privilege, the witness
having the right to testify or not. The
confidential communications privilege operates differently as it is a
jointly held privilege. Both privileges have a number of exceptions
which prevent misuse and abuse of
the privilege concept.
On August 9, 1986, the Criminal
Justice Section of the American Bar
Association adopted a model parent-child privilege. (See "A Model
Parent-Child Privilege," on page 34)
It is similar to the two part spousal
privilege, encompassing both an
adverse-testimonial and a confidential-communications privilege. The
statute is narrowly drafted and covers a parent and his or her child only.
It is not a broad family privilege.
There are a number of reasons for
such a statute to be adopted by state
legislatures or used as a guideline by
the federal courts. There is a need
for continuity and predictability in

law. As far as this issue is concerned, there is neither. The second
and most important reason is to
protect the family from unnecessary
intrusion by the government or overzealous prosecutors. As Professor
Irving Younger has stated, "We
know that one of the horrors of Nazi
Germany was children snitching on
their parents. It seems to me common decency that you don't put a
child before a grand jury on her
mother's conduct." Burke, "Nevada Girl 16, Ordered to Testify

true in a criminal case. Not only is
there a compelling state interest in
protecting its citizens, but the child's
actions might be construed as sufficiently egregious to exceed the protective bounds of autonomous
discretion, which is generally free
from governmental intrusion.
It might also reasonably be argued that other decisions of the
Court on the topic of privacy erode
the proponents' constitutional ar-

gument. In a line of decisions the
Court has indicated that a child's
decision to obtain an abortion may
not be blocked by her parents. See,
e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
Thus, even within the sanctity of the
family parents' control is not unlimited, and may be curtailed for the
good of the child. Itwould seem that
the same argument would support
limited governmental intrusion for

Against Mother," Nat'l L.J., Mar. 9,

1981, at 3, col. 2.
Adoption of the parent-child
privileges isthe logical extension of
the spousal privileges. Most courts
accept, and society sanctions, the
need for the spousal privilege. It is
hard to believe that state legislatures and Congress in adopting the
marital privileges intended to suggest the parent-child relationship
was less deserving of attention and
protection by the law. The parentchild relationship is life-long. Unlike
the other relationships now protected by privileges, the parent-child
relationship is terminated only by
death of the parent, and not merely
by payment of a fee or by a judicial
C)
decree.
A complete discussion of the legal and social arguments supporting a parent-child
privilege, and a description of a model privileges statute developed by the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section, can be
found in Volume 28 of the William and Mary
Law Review.

No
(Continued from page 13)
elation of the truth is in issue.
Assuming communications between a parent and child are entitled
to some constitutional protection,
and compelled testimony is considered a substantial intrusion, the government might still reasonably deny
reliance upon that protection where
revelation of those communications
is necessary to determine the truth
in a trial-a compelling government
interest. This would seem especially
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the specific purpose of determining
the truth in a judicial proceeding.
The constitutional right to
freedom of religion
Proponents sometimes advance
the constitutional argument that
compelling testimony from a child
will violate the family's religious beliefs and constitute unconstitutional
infringement of the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. The
argument runs that in some religions
much spiritual emphasis is placed on
the sanctity of the family-at least
two courts have applied the privilege on religious grounds. See, e.g.,
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Agosto),
553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
Again, like the privacy argument,
there is some superficial appeal to
this justification. For mainline religions it isgenerally not difficult to find
in religious teachings or writings
credible references to family unity
and respect for one's parents and
elders. Indeed, for those of the Judeo-Christian faiths, the Fourth
Commandment mandates that children are to honor their fathers and
mothers. Most theologians would
nonetheless struggle with the delicate questions that might arise if, in
the search for truth, reliable evidence was stifled by reliance on similar teachings.
The possible conflict of religious
values, however, poses a problem
for codifying any particular parentchild privilege. While there are apparently some religious writings that
urge protection of the family relationship there are also some that
recognize the ability of parents to
testify against their children. In the
Old Testament book of Deuteronomy, Chapter 21, verses 18-21, the
book of Mosaic law, instruction is
given for dealing with troublesome
children: Parents of a rebellious and
stubborn son, who will not listen to
them, is to be taken to the city elders at the city gate where they are
to testify against him. The penalty is
death.
Particular religious beliefs notwithstanding, the courts have rec-
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ognized time and again that the
freedom to practice one's religion,
although fundamental, is not absolute. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 106 S.
Ct. 2417 (1986); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982). In the proper
circumstances the need for determining truth in a trial may outweigh
religious tenets compelling silence.
Like the tests for measuring the constitutionality of government intrusion into certain privacy interests,
the inquiry would be: Assuming that
the government has substantially interfered with the practice of religion, it must demonstrate a
compelling government interest and
use of necessary means to further
that interest. Obtaining reliable evidence for a trial, especially a criminal trial, should be considered a
compelling interest.
The difficulty with relying upon
this constitutional justification for a
parent-child privilege is the reluctance of the courts to intrude into
the legitimacy of a particular religious belief. However, they may inquire into the centrality and sincerity
of the belief. Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Social policy arguments
Proponents of a parent-child privilege argue that important and compelling interests are at stake
whenever a child or parent is compelled to testify against the other.
They argue that studies indicate that
the nuclear family is in danger of extinction and that any privilege protecting the family will serve as an
invaluable bastion against external
threats. The family, they continue,
should be permitted to work
through any problems that might be
presented by the private communications between family members.
These arguments have some surface appeal. Most parents welcome
and encourage frank communications with their children. But the
credibility of these arguments suffers somewhat when it becomes apparent that neither proponents nor
opponents of the parent-child privilege can cite convincing empirical

data to show whether such a privilege ever encourages frank and
confidential discussions. It is much
easier, and more convincing, to
consider the tangible and immediate effects of using the privilege to
block the introduction of probative
evidence. Second, the difficulty in
relying upon a particular social theory or philosophy for a privilege is
that other equally credible social
movements or theories may be ignored. For example, advocates of
the popular "tough love" movement might conceivably welcome
the ability of parents to offer incriminating testimony concerning disposition of a child accused of
criminal conduct. A child's or some
other third person's ability to block
that testimony would then interfere
with the parents' autonomous rights
to rear their children as they deem
necessary.
Another argument raised in support of the privilege isgrounded on
the natural repugnancy of requiring
family members to testify against
each other. Again, most would agree
that to rely upon such testimony is
troubling and should be avoided.
But should that fact support a privilege which would apply even where
it would not be repugnant and
would not create a dilemma for the
testifying member?
Examples sometimes used to advance this argument are the reminders that totalitarian governments
do not recognize a parent-child privilege. Such reminders do little more
than stir the emotions and ignore the
fact that, until recently, the courts
and commentators paid little if any
serious attention to such a privilege.
And most citizens of this country do
not view our system of government,
past or present, as approaching anything like Nazi Germany or Soviet
Russia. As with any aspect of the judicial process which is subject to
abuse, the courts and the public response to "repugnant" use of familial testimony provides a remedy.
Few prosecutors are willing to incur
public wrath and criticism for needless use of testimony of either a child
or a parent against the other. In short,
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the fear of abuse is simply not
enough cause to codify a parentchild privilege. Fear of abuse is not
grounds for blanket exclusion of otherwise reliable evidence.
A related social policy argument
sometimes raised is the assertion
that calling a family member to the
stand creates a cruel trilemma for
that witness. The witness must either
(1) testify truthfully and condemn
the accused relative; (2)testify falsely
and commit perjury; or (3) refuse to
testify and risk contempt. That same
trilemma, however, faces every witness. Isthe trilemma for the witness
any less compelling when the accused is a lifelong friend or associate? Some would answer that when
blood ties are at stake, the burden
on the witness isespecially difficult.
That response seems to place a
higher premium on mere blood ties.
In some cases that is all that exists
where the child or parent has shown
little or no love or respect-until
criminal proceedings are commenced. The problem with this particular social argument is that it
assumes that whatever familial tie
existed will necessarily vanish once
the witness iscompelled to take the
stand. If the family relationship is indeed based on trust and respectthe proponents' basis for the privilege-then that relationship should
withstand government compulsion
to testify. Even assuming that the re-.
lationship would suffer, it is not
enough reason to codify a privilege
and block otherwise reliable evidence.
Other legal arguments
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is
sometimes cited as authority for
codifying a parent-child privilege.
The argument generally isthat Congress recognized the importance of
developing privileges in American
jurisprudence and that the flexible
language of Rule 501 not only permits the adoption of new privileges
but also encourages such adoption.
A review of the history of Rule 501
indicates that it was a compromise.
There was such a negative response
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to the adoption of any privileges that
Congress decided to defer to the
courts. For a discussion of the legislative history see S. Saltzburg and
K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 331 (4th ed. 1986).
But that compromise can hardly be
viewed as a mandate to codify a
parent-child privilege which to this
point has been rejected by most of
the courts which have considered
it. Rule 501 can be relied upon just
as strongly by opponents of the
privilege. The better course isto test
the viability of the privilege in the
courts and not rush to codification.
A second legal argument for
adopting a parent-child privilege
rests in comparing other contemporary privileges which have commonly protected a wide range of
interests, including financial interests. If our judicial system is willing
to protect relationships such as marriage, an attorney-client or doctorpatient relationship through use of
privileges, then surely, the argument continues, the system should
protect the parent-child relationship. In some jurisdictions that argument might well, in itself, carry the
day. The fact that other less altruistic relationships are protected is an
attractive justification. But it is simply not attractive enough to warrant
codification of an additional privilege. The argument assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that all existing
privileges are necessary and that the
slippery slope of adopting additional privileges is a desirable one.
If a parent-child privilege is widely
adopted, it isnot difficult to imagine
calls for extension of similar privileges to any relationship. At least
one commentator has called for
adoption of a privilege for "shared
intimate relationships" which would
include protection of confidential
communications between "intimate friends." DevelopmentsPrivileged Communications, supra, at
1590.
A significant factor in rejecting a
confidential communications privilege for the parent-child relationship is that there is little, if any,
reason to believe that the parent and

child would ever count on such a
privilege in making statements to
one another. In many of the other
privileges, either one of the parties,
usually a professional, can be
counted on to inform the other that
what is said will remain confidential.
Indeed, the drafters of the proposed federal rule governing a marital privilege did not include a
confidential communications provision for this very reason. Similar
analysis would support rejection of
protection for any family communications.
Summary
None of the various justifications
for adoption of a parent-child privilege is compelling. The constitutional arguments are grounded
primarily on dicta or analogy. Although some courts have relied
upon the right of privacy and free
exercise clause, there is no Supreme Court opinion holding that
confidential communications are
constitutionally protected.
The remaining arguments are
founded primarily on sociological
and psychological viewpoints which
are superficially attractive but insufficient to block otherwise reliable
information from the fact-finders. In
the balance, the need for such information outweighs any constitutional or social interest which the
parent and child might otherwise
possess.
This does not mean that prosecutors or police should necessarily
encourage children or parents to
"snitch" on the other. What it
means isthat when one of them voluntarily walks into the police station
with a garbage bag of drugs or an
earful of incriminating statements,
the prosecutor should be able to use
C)
that evidence.
In The Next
Criminal Justice
Jury Selection
After Batson
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